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The impact of active labour market programmes on the duration
of unemployment in Switzerland
Abstract
This article evaluates the effects of Swiss active labour market programmes on the job chances of
unemployed workers. The main innovation is a comparison of two important dynamic evaluation
estimators: the ‘matching' estimator and the ‘timing-of-events' estimator. We find that both estimators
generate different treatment effects. According to the matching estimator temporary subsidised jobs
shorten unemployment duration whereas training programmes and employment programmes do not. In
contrast, the timing-of-events estimator suggests that none of the Swiss active labour market
programmes shortens unemployment duration.
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Abstrat
This paper evaluates the eets of Swiss ative labour market programs on the job
hanes of unemployed workers. The main innovation is a omparison of two important
dynami evaluation estimators: the \mathing" estimator and the \timing-of-events"
estimator. We nd that both estimators generate dierent treatment eets. Aording
to the mathing estimator temporary subsidised jobs shorten unemployment duration
whereas training programs and employment programs do not. In ontrast, the timing-of-
events estimator suggests that none of the Swiss ative labour market programs shorten
unemployment duration.
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The aim of the present paper is to study the impat of ative labour market poliies
(ALMPs) on the duration of unemployment in Switzerland. The new Swiss ALMPs reet
the inreasing onsensus among poliy makers that atively assisting the unemployed in job
searh is preferable to simply providing them with passive inome support. The danger is, so
the argument goes, that reliane on passive inome support may redue work inentives and
job-searh ativities and therefore inrease the risk of long-term unemployment. ALMPs are
seen by many as the key to minimise these risks.
The question how partiipation in ALMP-measures aets labour market histories of indi-
viduals has been the subjet of substantial debate. The main problem is that labour market
outomes for partiipants may be systematially dierent from non-partiipants for reasons
that are unobservable to the researher { the seletion problem (see Hekman et al., 1999).
In Switzerland, like in most European ountries, but unlike in the US, randomised soial ex-
periments are unommon, so one has to deal with non-experimental data. In theory, several
methods an be used to estimate the treatment eets of ALMPs. Eah of these methods deals
with the seletion problem under dierent assumptions. In the ase of unemployment dura-
tion as variable of interest two methods are partiularly useful. The rst one is the method
of `mathing ', the seond one is the `timing-of-events' method.
The main innovation of the present paper is a diret omparison between the timing-of-
events approah and the mathing approah in estimating the eet of ALMPs on the rate
by whih unemployed individuals nd regular jobs. The method of mathing is based on the
onditional independene assumption. If many variables that inuene both labour market
outomes and the seletion proess are observed, potential outomes and seletion are inde-
pendent onditional on the observables. The identifying assumption is that, after aounting
for many observable variables (inluding individual's past labour market performane), no un-
observed heterogeneity orrelated with potential outomes and program partiipation is left.
Among the many studies that use the mathing approah, the studies of Gern and Lehner
(2002) and Gern et al. (2005) are of interest here as they also evaluate the eet of Swiss
ALMPs on unemployment duration. Both studies nd that employment programs perform
very poorly, voational training programs show a rather mixed performane depending on the
spei subprogram onsidered, whereas temporary subsidised jobs appears to be suessful
in terms of inreasing the hanes on the labour market.
1
The timing-of-events method allows for seletion on unobservables in postulating a multi-
variate mixed proportional hazard model in whih both the inow into an ALMP program and
the outow from unemployment are speied and allowed to interat. The identifying assump-
tion is that these transition proesses an be modelled as a multivariate mixed proportional
hazard (MMPH) model. The intuition is that, under this assumption, information on the or-
relations between the unobserved heterogeneity omponents in the exit from unemployment
and the entrane into ALMPs an be obtained from (i) the duration until the program starts
and (ii) the duration of unemployment. Beause unobserved heterogeneity omponents are
modelled expliitly, the treatment eet is estimated onditional on observed and unobserved
variables taking into aount that the unobserved variables may inuene both proesses. The
timing-of-events method is a rather new approah and has been applied in only a few previous
studies.
2
In omparing the timing-of-events approah and the mathing approah in estimating the
1
For a further mathing study that also looks at the impat of ALMPs in Switzerland see Prey (2000).
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Gritz (1993) onsiders the impat of training on the employment experiene of Amerian youths and
Bonnal et al. (1997) study the eet of publi employment poliies set up in Frane during the 1980's. Van
den Berg et al. (2002) studies the eets of temporary jobs in the Netherlands and both Abbring et al. (2005),
Lalive et al. (2005) and Van den Berg et al. (2004) study the eet of benet santions. Two studies losely
related to ours are Rihardson and Van den Berg (2001) in whih the eet of voational employment training
on the transition rate from unemployment to work is investigated and Crepon et al. (2005) who study the
eet of ounselling programs on unemployment duration and reurrene.
eet of ALMPs, we proeed as follows. First, we ompare the mathing approah with a
proportional hazard approah that both rely on onditional independene. We nd that the
estimated treatment eets are very muh the same. While training programs and employment
programs have no eet, temporary subsidised jobs have a positive eet on the job nding
rate. Seond, the timing-of-events approah allows us to introdue potential seletivity in
both observable harateristis and unobservable harateristis. If we estimate a MMPH
model whih allows for seletion on unobservable harateristis in addition to observable
harateristis none of the treatment eets is positive. So, if unobserved heterogeneity is
allowed to inuene the inow into ALMPs the timing-of-events approah and the mathing
approah nd dierent treatment eets.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next setion we desribe the Swiss labour market
poliy in more detail. In Setion 3 we provide spei information on our data set, a weighted
random sample of entrants into unemployment in Switzerland over the four{months period
Deember 1997 to Marh 1998. Setion 4 disusses the modelling of dynami treatment eets
in more detail. The results of our analysis are presented in Setion 5. Setion 6 onludes.
1 Labour Market Poliy in Switzerland
In 1997 the Swiss government introdued a reform of unemployment insurane that onstituted
a hange away from passive inome maintenane towards ative measures. The new law obliged
the Swiss antons to supply a minimum number of ALMP-plaes per year. Eonomy-wide,
these requirements add up to a stok of 25,000 plaes. This ompares to an average stok of
unemployment of about 188,000 individuals in 1997 and about 140,000 in 1998.
The new law inreased maximum benet entitlement and, at the same time, reated a
lose link between unemployment benet entitlement and partiipation in an ative measure.
For a newly unemployed the maximum entitlement period is 104 weeks, up from originally
80 weeks.
3
The benet entitlement period is divided into two dierent parts. For at most 7
months the job-seeker an reeive unemployment benets, unonditional upon partiipation
in an ative measure. For the remaining 17 months unemployment benets are paid only if
the unemployed is willing to partiipate in a measure.
Employment servie sta deides on partiipation in ALMPs based on subjetive evaluation
of the job-seekers employment prospets. Individuals are notied about their partiipation into
a program one or two weeks in advane. A job seeker is not allowed to refuse partiipation one
he or she is assigned to partiipate in an ALMP. Refusal to partiipate results in withholding
of benet payments for a period of 1 to 30 days.
4
As mentioned by the OECD (1996), the new Swiss unemployment insurane system is an
ambitious one. Compared to other ountries the Swiss rules are dierent in at least two impor-
tant respets. First, the intervention takes plae at a rather early stage of the unemployment
spell, after seven months. And seondly, for training ourses and employment programs, ben-
et payments are onditional upon ALMP-partiipation and this partiipation does not lead
to a new benet entitlement. In ontrast, temporary subsidised jobs lead to a new benet
entitlement. Note, however, that most individuals enter this program at a rather early stage
of the unemployment spell so it is rather unlikely that individuals use this program to aquire
prolonged unemployment benets.
5
The ALMP-measures an be divided into four ategories:
1. Basi Training. The job ourses usually last 3 weeks and aim at improving the ee-
tiveness of individual job searh (how to write appliation letters, how to behave at job
3
The above entitlement regulation holds for an individual who has been employed and has ontributed to
the insurane system for at least 6 within the last 24 months.
4
See Lalive et al. (2005) for an evaluation of the Swiss santion system.
5
The average elapsed duration at entry is less than 3 months, see Table 1 whih is disussed in more detail
below.
talks) and self-esteem. The omputer ourses last about 3 weeks and refer to basi word
proessing and spreadsheet alulation. The language ourses last about 2 months and
inlude reading and writing skills. Language ourses are more likely to be attended by
foreigners but also native Swiss attend these ourses frequently.
2. Advaned Training. Voational training ourses last slightly less than two months and
provide voational training in business administration and related areas. Other ourses
last about 2 months and onern a rather heterogeneous group of ourse types, inluding
spei omputer training, business administration, tehnial training, ourses in the
tourism and the health setor.
3. Employment programs. These refer to temporary jobs in the non-prot setor, whih
last about 5 months. The jobs may be provided by both private setor (NGOs) and
publi setor (suh as ommunal oÆes).
4. Subsidised jobs. These are atual low-wage jobs that rms register with the publi
employment servie or that rms oer to an unemployed individual. These jobs are
onsidered to be temporary beause the wage in theses jobs is below the oÆial minimum
of 67% of the previous wage (the \reasonability" limit). The individual is still expeted
to searh for a new regular job. It is not possible for rms to redue the wage payment
for suh a job in order to benet from the subsidy.
6
Table 1
Table 1 presents detailed desriptive statistis on the programs. These statistis, based on
6
An unemployed individual who aepts suh a low-wage job gets 70 or 80% of the dierene between the
previous wage and the wage in the subsidised job as a wage supplement by the unemployment insurane. Note
that temporary subsidised jobs are not part of the oÆial ALMP. However, in terms of their set-up and the
way they operate there is no reason to exlude them from the analysis. On the ontrary, to analyse the eets
of poliy interventions in full detail it is neessary to inlude temporary subsidised jobs.
the dataset we desribe in more detail in the next setion, indiate that in terms of number of
partiipants job training and subsidised jobs are the most important programs. Unemployed
workers enter a program after about 3 months of unemployment but the variation is onsid-
erable as an be seen from the standard deviation of the elapsed unemployment duration at
program entry.
It is worth noting that various programs also dier in terms of hours spent on the program.
Training ourses typially require weekly hours equivalent to a part-time job, whereas the time-
intensity of employment programs are equivalent to a full-time job. Subsidised jobs an be
either full-time or part-time. Individuals are required to searh for a regular job while attending
a program. However, job searh requirements are redued for partiipants in training ourses.
One should also note that training ourses and employment programs involve osts that go
beyond the payment of individual benets. While training ourses and employment programs
involve onsiderable diret osts, this is not the ase for subsidised jobs. As the wage subsidy
to the temporary jobs amounts to 70 or 80% of the dierene between the previous wage and
the new wage, working in a subsidised job inreases an individual's inome. (The wage plus
wage subsidy amounts to more than the unemployment benet, at most 96% of the previous
wage). As the unemployment benet amounts to 70 or 80% of the previous wage, a subsidised
job is heaper in terms of transfer payment from the unemployment insurane system to the
individual. As there are no major diret osts, subsidised jobs seem to be a rather inexpensive
program.
7
7
A Swiss study onduted by BASS (1999) estimates that, in the absene of the subsidised job program,
total expenditures of the unemployment system as a whole would be 4% higher.
2 Data
The data set from whih we drew our sample, overs all unemployment entrants in Switzerland
over the period Deember 1997 to Marh 1998 and follows these individuals up to the end of
May 1999. These data ome from administrative reords of the State Seretariat for Eonomi
Aairs (AVAM- and ASAL-database). Among the 70,445 workers who started an unemploy-
ment spell during the above period we onentrate our empirial analysis on a subsample of
those workers for whom we ould math the information of the AVAM- and ASAL-database
with information from soial seurity reords (AHV-data). The latter provide detailed infor-
mation on individuals' earnings and employment histories over the last 10 years prior to their
unemployment spells.
We had only limited aess to the soial seurity reords. These data available to us
ontains a 50% random sample of the inow in Deember 1997, and a 30% random sample of
the inow from January 1998 to Marh 1998. In the analysis in Setion 5 we aount for this
by weighting eah observation by the inverse of the probability of being in the random soial
seurity sample. The sample on whih our empirial estimates are based ontains 15,073 job
seekers.
8
Figure 1 shows the transition rates from unemployment to regular jobs and from unemploy-
ment to ALMPs.
9
There is a very strong inrease in the probability of entering both regular
jobs and ALMPs, from about 5% per month in the rst month of unemployment, up to a level
of almost 15-20% per month in the third month of unemployment. Thereafter, the transition
rates revert to a level of 5% per month and remain at that level from month 6 onwards. The
8
We removed all job seekers who were not entitled to unemployment benets, were re-entering unemploy-
ment within a period of two alendar years, were aged younger than 20 years or older than 49 years, were
disabled or were foreigners with an asylum seeker or seasonal permit.
9
The transition rates aount for ensoring by the Kaplan-Meier method.
patterns of both transition rates are very similar.
10
Thus, the proess of nding jobs ould be
aeted by similar fators as the proess of nding a suitable ative labour market program.
Figure 1 and Figure 2
Figure 2 shows the monthly empirial hazard rates for transitions from unemployment in
more detail. The diret transition rate to jobs, labelled as \no ALMP" is idential to the one
presented in Figure 1. This baseline exit rate serves to establish the eets of the programs
as we disuss in the following setion. Dening t

as the duration until entry into an ALMP
we distinguish three groups, those that enter in the rst three months \ALMP: t

< 3", those
that enter between 3 and 6 months \ALMP: 3  t

< 6", and those who enter after 6 months
of unemployment \ALMP: 6  t

". Compared to the baseline hazard rate, the exit rate of
the ALMP-partiipants is lower initially, but tends to be higher than the baseline hazard rate
after a period of at most 4 months. This suggests that apturing the dynamis of the eet
of the ALMP on the hazard rate ompared to non-partiipation may be important.
3 Modelling Dynami Treatment Eets
This setion disusses our identiation strategy. The logi of our approah is simple. We
rst disuss two important onsiderations that arise when a program is dynamially assigned
to individuals. Seond, we propose two estimators that identify the eets of treatments
when treatment assignment is ignorable onditional on the information provided by the data.
Whereas the mathing estimator just uses the onditional independene assumption, the haz-
ard estimator restrits the hazard rate of the outome proess to follow the proportional
hazard restrition. The setion nally disusses the possibility that seletion is also based on
unobservables.
10
Note that with the exeption of the employment programs, the temporal pattern of the separate program
entry rates is qualitatively similar to the overall ALMP entry rate.
3.1 The Start of a Treatment
When investigating the eets of ALMPs one has to deal with two questions onerning the
start of the program, i.e. the start of the treatment. The rst question is whether unemployed
individuals antiipated the start of a program; the seond question is when the potential eets
of the treatment an be expeted to our, right from the start of the program or after the
program has ended.
As Abbring and Van den Berg (2003) indiate in the setting of a timing-of-events analysis
unemployed individuals are not allowed to antiipate the start of the program a long time in
advane. Individuals who antiipate the start of the program may redue their searh intensity
prior to the start. In that ase the eets of the program are overestimated. We think that
antiipation is not a problem in the Swiss ase. As disussed in Setion 2 job seekers are
notied about atual partiipation only one or two weeks in advane. Therefore, even if they
would have wanted to reat they did not have a lot of time to reat.
11
The relevant starting date of potential ALMP-eets depends on the nature of the program.
In ase of training ourses, where program duration is established in advane and partiipants
should follow a partiular urriulum, it makes sense to start investigating the eets of the
program after it has nished. Then, as in Rihardson and Van den Berg (2001), the length
of time intervals spent in a program is set to zero (i.e. \the alendar time lok is stopped"
while partiipants are in the program). However, in ase of subsidised jobs or employment
programs, partiipants are expeted to nd a regular job as soon as possible and should aept
any suitable job oer. Then, partiipants an leave the program to take a regular job at any
time and stopping the alendar time lok (i.e. disregarding the interval during whih the
11
Furthermore, during our observation period, there was a lak of available ALMP slots so individuals ould
not antiipate to get into a program eventually (see Lehner and Frolih, 2005). Finally, job seekers were
aware of the fat that they ould be penalised if they redued their searh eorts in antiipation of program
partiipation.
individual is in the program) does not make sense. In other words, whether or not one should
investigate the eets on the job nding rate from the start of the program depends on the
nature of the program. Note, however, that in both ases there is a loking-in eet. In
ase of a training program the loking-in eet is exogenous in the sense that partiipants are
expeted to nish the program and will not start a new job before the program is nished.
12
In ase of a subsidised job or an employment program the loking-in eet is endogenous in
the sense that it is determined by the searh behaviour of the partiipant. Therefore, for these
programs we investigate the treatment eets from the moment they start. To ompare the
treatment eets aross programs we do the same for training ourses.
3.2 Seletion on Observables
Mathing Estimator
We start our empirial analysis below with a mathing estimator that does not restrit the
way in whih ALMPs aet the exit rate. The estimator reognises that program partiipants
and non-partiipants may dier in two important respets. First, program partiipants may
be a seletive subset of the population with respet to observables. A meaningful omparison
group is therefore balaned with respet to these variables. The seond dierene arises due
to the fat that the timing of program partiipation is a proess with a strong stohasti
omponent.
13
This implies that ontrol individuals must be drawn from the set of individuals
that have neither left unemployment nor entered treatment at the moment when the treated
individual starts treatment.
In the evaluation, we fous on the eets of the rst treatment on the duration of unem-
12
Note that Rihardson and Van den Berg (2001) nd a positive treatment eet of voational employment
training only if the time spent in these programs is ignored.
13
See Fredriksson and Johansson (2003), Gern and Lehner (2002), Gern et al. (2005), and Sianesi (2004)
for evaluation studies in the random program start setting.
ployment. More preisely, we estimate the eet of a new training \sequene" on the remaining
duration of unemployment. If suh a sequene onsists of partiipating in two or more ALMPs,
information on the ourrene and timing of the seond (or third,...) spell is disregarded. The
various programs are indexed by p = 1; :::; 4.
14
The transition rate from unemployment to
program p is assumed to have a proportional hazard speiation given by

p
(tjx) = 
p
(t) exp(x
p
): (1)
where 
p
denotes the transition rate from unemployment to a program, t is the elapsed duration
of unemployment, and x is a vetor of individual and labour market harateristis that
determine this transition proess.
15
The baseline hazard rate 
p
allows for exible duration
dependene by using a step funtion

p
(t) = exp[
k

pk
I
k
(t)℄; (2)
where k = 1; ::; 5 is a subsript for time-intervals and I
k
(t) are time-varying dummy variables
for the following time intervals: 0-2 months, 3-5 months, 6-8 months, 9-11 months and 12 and
more months.
16
The proposed mathing estimator works as follows. In a rst step we estimate separate
transition rates to eah of the four programs. This gives an estimate of the transition rate of
14
p = 1 indexes basi training, p = 2 advaned training, p = 3 employment programs and p = 4 subsidised
jobs.
15
Speially, these observables are gender, marital status, number of dependents, age, residene permit
(applies to non-Swiss residents), mother tongue, skill level, position in the previous rm, type of job required
(in same industry, part-time), previous industry, previous oupation, previous wage, duration of previous
job, reent labour market history (1995-1997), distant labour market history (1988-1994), inow period, the
unemployment rate in the anton of residene of the job seeker in the month prior to entering unemploy-
ment (time-invariant), proportion of unemployed in ALMP, voting in a 1997 referendum on benet uts, and
employability.
16
In a sensitivity analysis, we use a very exible baseline hazard whih is allowed to shift every month.
individual i to eah program p:
b

i
p
(t) =
b

p
(t) exp(x
i
b

p
).
In the seond step we selet, for eah partiipant i in program p; the \nearest neighbour"
in terms of the transition rate to program p. Note that the transition rate to the program
is the instantaneous propensity sore.
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The set of potential nearest neighbours onsists of
observations that are still \at risk" of entering program p as their rst program. In other
words, these are observations that have neither entered an ALMP nor aepted a regular job
before observation i entered program p. Let T
u
denote the random variable that haraterises
the duration of unemployment until the individual nds a regular job, and let T
p
denote the
random variable that haraterises the duration of unemployment until the start of program p:
We denote by
~
T the random variable that haraterises the duration until the individual either
nds a regular job or starts her rst treatment, so
~
T = min(T
u
; T
1
; :::; T
4
): And we denote by
~
t a partiular realisation of
~
T : The set of potential ontrol observations for individual i with
T
i
p
=
~
t
i
(somebody whose rst program is p) is given by A
i
 fjj
~
t
j
>
~
t
i
; j 6= ig: The \nearest
neighbour" is the observation j 2 A
i
that minimises abs[
b

j
p
(
~
t
i
) 
b

i
p
(
~
t
i
)℄.
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The nal step involves estimating the ounterfatual survivor funtion of the treated ob-
servations by using the information provided by ontrol observations. There are two im-
portant onsiderations in this step. First ontrol observations may be treated in the fu-
ture.
19
Thus, for ontrol observations the remaining duration of unemployment is given by
min(T
j
u
 T
i
p
; T
j
1
 T
i
p
; :::; T
j
4
 T
i
p
); i.e. the time remaining in unemployment without partiipat-
ing in any of the four programs. The ounterfatual survivor funtion an be reovered from
information on this remaining duration of ontrol observations, treating as right-ensored all
observations going to an ALMP. Seond, it is possible that the distribution of the bakground
17
The instantaneous propensity sore akin to suggestions by Robins et al. (2000), Lehner (2004) and Hirano
and Imbens (2004).
18
Similar to Sianesi (2004) we impose a aliper of 0.01 in determining the nearest neighbour.
19
This has led to fousing on the eet of \being treated now vs. being treated in the future" (Fredriksson
and Johansson, 2003; Sianesi, 2004).
harateristis of the treated and the mathed ontrol is not perfetly balaned. We address
possible imbalane by implementing a bias orretion along the lines suggested by Abadie and
Imbens (2002). We rst used the data on mathed ontrols to estimate a proportional hazard
model of the transition rate from unemployment to regular jobs in the absene of treatment.
Then we use the resulting parameter estimates to predit the probability that eah treated
individual remains unemployed as a funtion of the time elapsed sine the treatment started.
This proedure ensures that potential dierenes in the distribution of the observed hara-
teristis of treated individuals and their mathed ontrols do not bias the estimates of the
treatment eet.
The entral identifying assumption that justies the mathing estimator is that onditional
on observed harateristis of the individuals assignment to program p is independent of the
potential remaining duration without the program. This onditional independene assump-
tion has been justied by Gern and Lehner (2002) by the fat that the Swiss unemployment
insurane register is extremely rih in terms of observed harateristis. In partiular, the data
ontain information on employability, a subjetive aseworker assessment of the likely labour
market prospets of the job seeker lled out at the start of the unemployment spell. Note,
however that the employability variable is a subjetive measure and may not ontain ompre-
hensive information on the partiular problems and handiaps of the individual job searher.
The MMPH model onsidered below allows for the possibility that this subjetive employa-
bility information may not be suÆient to remove unobserved heterogeneity. Fredriksson and
Johansson (2003) show that when the onditional independene assumption holds, the eet
of treatment on the treated an be identied by ontrasting the outomes of individuals who
are treated at
~
t to individuals who have not been treated until
~
t who have the same propensity
to enter treatment at time
~
t. Note that the propensity to enter treatment at time
~
t is idential
to the ALMP entry hazard rate 
p
(
~
tjx).
Proportional Hazard Model
Alternatively, we use a proportional hazard model to identify the treatment eets of the
various programs. Let
D
p
(t) = I(t >
~
t [
~
t = T
p
) (3)
be the indiator funtion that, after elapsed duration t, the individual has already entered his
or her rst program and that this is program p. This denes 4 treatment indiators D
1
; :::; D
4
,
one for eah program.
Note that beause we analyse the treatment eets of the four programs separately, it is
essential to ensor unemployment spells for job seekers leaving unemployment for a program
that is not being studied. For instane, when studying basi training the unemployment spell
is reorded as right ensored for all job seekers who enter advaned training, employment
programs, or subsidised jobs at the time when they enter those programs. The proportional
hazard estimator postulates that the transition rate from unemployment to regular jobs is

u
[tjx;D
p
(t)℄ = 
u
(t) exp[x
u
+ Æ
p
(t;
~
t)D
p
(t)℄: (4)
Where 
u
(tj) is the transition rate from unemployment to a regular job at elapsed duration of
unemployment t onditional on individual harateristis x and the treatment indiator D
p
(t).
The treatment eets are speied as Æ
p
(t;
~
t) = 
k
Æ
pk
I
k
(t 
~
t) where the Æ
pk
are parameters to
be estimated, and I
k
(t 
~
t) are dummy variables that vary with time sine start of treatment
t  
~
t for the intervals 0-2 months, 3-5 months, 6-8 months, and 9 months and longer. The
baseline hazard 
u
(t) is again allowed to vary with the elapsed duration of unemployment in
the same way as the program entry hazard rate. In separate estimates, the model estimates 4
treatment eet vetors Æ
p
, one for eah program. We keep the speiation exible and allow
treatment eets to vary over time.
The proportional hazard estimator identies the eet of ALMPs on the duration of un-
employment under two onditions. First, it assumes that onditional on observables x, par-
tiipation in the ALMP is not informative on unemployment duration without the program,
i.e. that seletion is based on observables. This is the assumption that is also required for
the mathing estimator. In addition, the proportional hazard estimator imposes a partiular
funtional form on the hazard rate. The assumption is that the harateristis x of the indi-
viduals shift the hazard rate in a proportional manner irrespetive of the time elapsed sine
the start of the spell.
Comparing the Two Methods
The fous of our evaluation is the ausal eet of treatment p on the remaining duration of
unemployment after the start of the program. Remaining duration of unemployment is given
by T
p
r
 T
p
u
 
e
T , where T
p
u
is total duration of unemployment with program p, and
e
T is the
duration of unemployment until the rst program starts. The ounterfatual is T
r
 T
u
 
e
T ;
that is, the remaining duration of unemployment without the program.
We ompare the results of the mathing estimator and the proportional hazard estimator
with respet to the eet of treatment p on those treated with program p, i.e. E(T
p
r
  T
r
j
e
T =
T
p
). The eet of treatment on the treated is useful in assessing whether program p has
ahieved the goal to foster re-entry of job seekers into regular jobs. Note, however, that the
eet of program p should not be ompared to the eet of program p
0
beause the program
p applies to a dierent subpopulation than the eet of program p
0
. An alternative parameter
is the average eet of treatment, that is, the eet of treatment on the average job seeker.
This parameter is useful in disussing the issue of whether the program should be extended
to the entire population of job seekers. We fous on the eet of treatment on the treated
beause this parameter is ruial in the ex post evaluation of the question whether ative
labour market programs are helpful in plaing job seekers that were aeted by the programs
into jobs.
Sine both T
p
r
and T
r
are positive random variables, the eet of treatment on the treated
an be represented as follows
E(T
p
r
  T
r
j
e
T = T
p
) =
Z
1
0
[S
p
r
(tj
e
T = T
p
)  S
r
(tj
e
T = T
p
)℄dt; (5)
where S
p
r
(tj
e
T = T
p
) is the survivor funtion of remaining duration with treatment p, i.e.
S
p
r
(tj
e
T = T
p
) = 1   Pr(T
p
r
> tj
e
T = T
p
); and S
r
(tj
e
T = T
p
) is the survivor funtion of the
ounterfatual remaining duration without treatment p. Note that right-ensoring of the
remaining duration of unemployment implies that the eet of treatment on the treated an
not be reovered from the data. Instead, we base our omparison of the results on the dierene
in the survivor funtion with treatment and the ounterfatual survivor funtion without
treatment in the rst 12 months after the start of the treatment.
20
The mathing estimator provides a mathed set of treated and ontrol observations. We
estimate the unonditional (with respet to x) survivor funtion with treatment and the un-
onditional ounterfatual survivor funtion in three steps. First, we estimate the onditional
hazard of leaving unemployment for regular jobs using maximum likelihood. Note that we
20
Note that the integral with respet to time sine start of this dierene gives the \eet of treatment on
the treated in the rst 12 months after start." We restrit attention to the rst 12 months after start due to
right ensoring. Sine the average time until the rst program starts is between 3 and 4 months and sine the
observation window overs at least 14 months (for those entering end of Marh 1998), ensoring is unlikely to
aet the results regarding the rst 12 months after the start of the program.
estimate the onditional ounterfatual hazard of leaving unemployment without treatment
using the mathed ontrol sample. In the seond step, we use the resulting estimates to
simulate both the onditional survivor funtion with treatment S
p
r
(tjx;
e
T = T
p
), and the on-
ditional ounterfatual survivor funtion without treatment S
r
(tjx;
e
T = T
p
) for eah person in
treatment p.
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In the third step, we average the onditional survivor funtions to estimate the
unonditional survivor funtion with treatment S
p
r
(tj
e
T = T
p
)  E[S
p
r
(tjx;
e
T = T
p
)jD
p
= 1℄,
and the unonditional ounterfatual survivor funtion without treatment S
r
(tj
e
T = T
p
) 
E[S
r
(tjx;
e
T = T
p
)jD
p
= 1℄.
The proportional hazard estimator gives the onditional (on observables x and program
entry times
e
t ) remaining duration survivor funtion with treatment
b
S
p
r
(tjx;
e
t) = expf 
R
t
0
b

u
[
e
t+
zjx;D
p
(
e
t + z)℄dzg.
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The onditional survivor funtion without treatment is obtained by
imposing non-partiipation, i.e. D
p
(
e
t+ z) = 0 everywhere. The unonditional survivor urves
are obtained by taking the average with respet of the distribution of x and program entry
times
~
t in the treated population of the orresponding onditional survivor funtions.
23
The omparison of the two estimators is based on the dierene in the unonditional sur-
vivor urves.
24
This dierene should be negligible if (i) the unemployment exit rate indeed
has a proportional struture, and (ii) the proportional hazard model is suÆiently exible
to apture treatment eet heterogeneity and the dynamis of the treatment eet. Note
that even if the empirial results suggest that the dierene in the mathing and proportional
21
Note that we estimate the ounterfatual survivor funtion in order to implement a bias orreted mathing
estimator as suggested in Abadie and Imbens (2002).
22
Note that D
p
(
e
t+ z) = 1 sine
e
t is the date of program entry.
23
A seond alternative to using bootstrap standard errors is use the asymptoti distribution of the pro-
portional hazard model parameters to alulate the asymptoti standard errors of the treatment eet in
the proportional hazard model. This strategy tends to give smaller standard errors beause the parametri
model is more eÆient. Nevertheless, we nd that our main onlusions regarding the omparison between
the mathing estimator and the proportional hazard estimator are robust to using standard errors due to the
proportional hazard model.
24
Note that in performing this omparison, we restrit attention to the set of partiipants in program p, for
whom we an nd a \nearest neighbour" aording to the mathing protool.
hazard estimates is not statistially dierent from zero it does not neessarily follow that the
proportionality restrition is valid. It appears possible to onstrut examples where propor-
tionality is violated but the semi-parametri mathing method and the proportional hazard
estimator nevertheless provide similar estimates. We nevertheless believe that it is instrutive
to perform this analysis beause it douments how strongly the important proportionality
assumption is aeting results.
Inferene is based on the variability of the dierene between the eet of treatment on the
treated survivor urve aording to mathing and the eet of treatment on the treated survivor
urve aording to the proportional hazard model in 250 sub-samples of the original dataset.
While the asymptoti distribution of the proportional hazard estimator are well understood, we
are not aware of asymptoti results for propensity sore mathing estimators that aount for
variability of the rst stage (see the survey by Imbens 2004). Note that bootstrapping leads to
biased inferene on the asymptoti variane of the mathing estimator (Abadie and Imbens,
2004). We therefore use subsampling. Politis and Romano (1994) show that subsampling
works if the sampling distribution of the dierene in survivor urves onverges weakly to the
underlying population distribution and the ratio between the sub-sample size b and the sample
size n onverges to zero as n tends to 1. Theoretial onsiderations regarding the hoie of b
are diÆult and beyond the sope of this paper. Our hoie of b was mainly guided by having
the sub-sample size b so large that all models an be alulated in subsamples.
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3.3 Allowing for Seletion on Unobservables
The third estimator relies strongly on the assumption of proportionality but it relaxes the
assumption of onditional independene. Arguably, even though the Swiss data ontain sub-
25
Speially, we x b = int(n
99=100
) whih is b = 13; 690. Note that b=n!1 as required for sub-sampling
to provide asymptotially valid estimates of the sampling distribution of the estimator.
jetive information on job seekers, the ase worker's assessment measure is unlikely to apture
all information that is relevant for ourse partiipation and labour market exit. Moreover, the
subjetive evaluation of the ase worker is a relatively rude measure that will not apture the
spei problems that redue employability of a partiular individual.
The estimator is based on the following mixed proportional hazard speiation for the
transition rate unemployment to a regular job

u
[tjx;D
p
(t); v
u
℄ = 
u
(t) exp[x
u
+ Æ
p
(t;
~
t)D
p
(t)℄v
u
: (6)
The term v
u
aptures heterogeneity that is unobserved to the researher and is allowed to be
orrelated with orresponding heterogeneity terms v
p
in the transition rate from unemployment
to program p, and v

in the proess that haraterises endogenous right ensoring when job
seekers exit unemployment for other ative labour market programs. The model for the
transition rate from unemployment to program p is

p
(tjx; v
p
) = 
p
(t) exp(x
p
)v
p
; (7)
and the model for entry into other programs { the endogenous right ensoring proess { is


(tjx; v

) = 

(t) exp(x

)v

; (8)
and the unknown joint distribution of the heterogeneity terms is denoted by G(v
u
; v
p
; v

).
Abbring and Van den Berg (2003a) prove that the model onsisting of (6) and (7) is
identied. Beause entry into other ative labour market programs is likely to be endogenous,
we add the third ensoring proess (8) to the basi `timing-of-events' model. The treatment
eet in this extended MMPH model is identied. The identiation proof in Abbring and
Van den Berg (2003a, p. 550) has two parts. The rst part notes that a model that ensors the
outome proess at the time of entry into program p is a basi and well-understood ompeting
risks model with unobserved heterogeneity. This model is identied regardless of the number
of proesses (Abbring and van den Berg, 2003b). The seond part of the proof shows that the
treatment eet is identied. This result does not depend on the number of ompeting risks
proess in the MMPH model. It follows that the model onsisting of the proesses (6), (7),
and (8) is identied.
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Estimating the model requires speiation of the joint distribution of the heterogeneity
terms G(v
u
; v
p
; v

). We follow the standard approah in the literature of approximating the
unknown joint distribution by means of a disrete distribution using non-parametri maximum
likelihood (NPMLE). We assume G to be a multivariate disrete distribution of unobserved
heterogeneity. Work by Hekman and Singer (1984) suggests that disrete distributions an
approximate any arbitrary distribution funtion G. We assume that eah transition rate has
two points of support { (v
u;a
; v
u;b
), (v
p;a
; v
p;b
), (v
;a
; v
;b
) { so the joint distribution therefore
has eight points of support.
The MMPH model relaxes the assumption of onditional independene of the potential
durations from program partiipation status. Note, however, that this generality omes at
a ost. First, it is neessary to speify a funtional form in whih heterogeneity enters the
hazard rate.
27
Seond, in single spell data, we have to assume that unobserved heterogeneity
is independent of the observables x. Third, as with the PH estimator, the assumption of
proportionality needs to hold. If these restritions hold, a omparison between the PH and
26
We thank Gerard van den Berg for pointing this out to us.
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Note that the above speiation is more restritive, however, than some of the models disussed in Abbring
and van den Berg (2003). For instane, the treatment eet is allowed to vary with respet to observables and
unobservables in Abbring and Van den Berg (2003).
the MMPH estimator allows investigating the extent to whih the assumption of \seletion on
observables" aets the estimated eet of ALMPs on unemployment duration.
4 Estimation Results
4.1 Aounting for Seletion on Observables
We present results of the mathing estimator in Figure 3. The vertial axis measures the
dierenes between the survivor funtion of the treated and the ounterfatual survivor fun-
tion estimated from mathed ontrol observations. For basi training and for employment
programs, this dierene is positive over almost the omplete year after the program start.
Even one year after program has started the dierene is lose to zero or even slightly positive.
Taken together this means that basi training and employment programs prolong the duration
of unemployment. Both advaned training and subsidised jobs also tend to prolong unem-
ployment initially during the rst 4 months (subsidised job) to 6 months (advaned training)
probably due to a loking-in eet. As time passes, however, there is a lear negative dierene
between the survivor funtion with treatment ompared to the ounterfatual. This dierene
is statistially signiant 6 months after a subsidised job has started. The dierene remains
insigniant for advaned training throughout the rst year after the program started. This
suggests that in the medium to long run advaned training and subsidised jobs an lead to a
redution in average unemployment duration.
Figure 3
The results presented in Figure 3 an be ompared to the results in Gern and Lehner
(2002) and Gern et al. (2003). In these papers, the dierene in the survivor urves are
also inreasing at early durations reahing a maximum after 3 to 5 months after the program
started and then start to deline. In quantitative amount the eets are somewhat dierent,
though. This may be due to two reasons. First, our sample diers from the one used in Gern
and Lehner (2002). The latter use a stok sample, whereas our sample is an inow sample.
Seond, our ontrol group onsists of individuals that are not yet treated but may be treated
at a later stage of the unemployment spell (in whih ase the information on the remaining
duration after program start is taken as ensored). In Gern and Lehner (2002) the ontrol
group onsists only of individuals that are never treated. Note, however, that in qualitative
terms the dynami patterns of the treatment eet is very similar. We observe an inrease
in the dierene in survivor rates between treatment and ontrol group at early remaining
durations, and the opposite pattern at later durations. Moreover, also in Gern and Lehner
(2002) subsidised jobs seem to be quite suessful.
The seond estimator that an be used to identify the ausal eets when seletion into
the programs is based on observables is the proportional hazard estimator. Table 2 shows
how the four programs aet the transition rate from unemployment to regular jobs as a
funtion of time elapsed sine the program started. There is a signiant redution in the
transition rate from unemployment to regular jobs in the rst 3 months (0 to 2 months) after
the program started for all programs exept for the subsidised jobs. This "loking-in-eet"
is strongest for employment programs implying a redution of the hazard rate by 53% (=
100[exp( 0:765) 1℄). The training programs are haraterised by somewhat weaker "loking-
in-eets" on the order of 19% for basi training and 24% for advaned training. Exits from
unemployment to regular jobs are, however, already slightly higher for the treated ompared
to the ounterfatual situation 3 to 5 months after the program starts for all programs exept
for basi training programs. The improvement in the hazard rate is, however, only signiant
for subsidised jobs. During 6 to 8 after their start, all Swiss ative labour market programs
are shown to improve the job hanes of partiipating job seekers. Only for basi training, the
positive eet is not signiantly dierent from zero. When 9 and more months have elapsed
all programs signiantly improve job hanes of job seekers.
It is interesting to know whether the initial negative eet of most of the programs is
more than ompensated later on, i.e. whether the net program eet is positive. One way
to investigate the net program eet in the ontext of a proportional hazard model is to use
time-invariant treatment eets (Panel B in Table 2). Proportional hazard models with a
time-invariant treatment eet indiate that the net eet is signiantly negative for basi
training and employment programs. The net eet point estimate is positive but not signif-
iantly dierent from zero for advaned training. Subsidised jobs are the only program with
a statistially signiantly positive eet on exits from unemployment to regular jobs. The
results onerning the subsidised jobs imply that on average these jobs inrease the regular
job nding rate with 9.4%.
Table 2
Figure 4 ompares the results due to the mathing estimator with the result due to the
proportional hazard estimator. This omparison is important. The mathing estimator is
just identied if seletion into treatment is onditionally independent of potential outomes.
The proportional hazard estimator also requires exogenous partiipation but, in addition, also
imposes a proportional struture on the unemployment exit rate. A omparison of mathing
results and proportional hazard results thus assesses the robustness of our ndings to the
imposing proportionality of the hazard rate. Figure 4 reports the dierene in the ausal eet
aording to the proportional hazard estimator and the ausal eet aording to the mathing
estimator. A positive number thus indiates that the proportional hazard estimator is more
pessimisti regarding the eets of Swiss ative labour market programs on unemployment
duration. Figure 4 also reports the 95% ondene interval on the dierene in ausal eets
estimated by subsampling (see setion 4). Figure 4 shows that the results for the proportional
hazard estimator are basially idential to the results for the mathing estimator in a statistial
sense. There is no statistially signiant divergene of results for any of the four programs
onsidered. Figure 4 thus shows that if onditional independene is valid, the results are not
sensitive to imposing a proportional struture on the hazard rate.
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Figure 4
4.2 Allowing for Unobserved Heterogeneity
We study the treatment eets of the programs in more detail by introduing unobserved
heterogeneity into the analysis and estimate MMPH models. Table 3 reports the estimated
treatment eets
Table 3
As shown, in eah of the estimated models unobserved heterogeneity is identied although
the number of masspoints depends on the program investigated. For instane, there are four
masspoints for basi training. Conditional on observed harateristis and elapsed duration
there is a group of unemployed individuals onsisting of 93.0% of the sample that have a
high exit rate to a regular job, a high exit rate to a ourse and a high exit rate to other
programs { the ensoring rate. The other groups of 3.3%, 1.8% and 1.9% have dierent
ombinations of transitions rates but the shear size of the rst group implies that there is
a positive orrelation between the unobserved omponents of the job nding rate and the
28
Note that this does not imply that the proportional struture is orret. It merely implies that the
proportional struture does not bias results in a statistially signiant way. Moreover, Figure 4 also does
not allow investigating whether assuming proportionality for observed and unobserved harateristis biases
results.
transition rate to ourses. There ould be several reasons for suh a positive orrelation.
It ould result from the inentives of aseworkers. In order to have a favourable plaement
reord, aseworkers may send those unemployed with the highest hanes of getting a regular
job into basi training. It ould also be the ase that individuals with the better hanes to
get a regular job are better motivated to do a ourse for some intermediate period.
The number of mass points identied ranges from three in the model with advaned training
to six in the model with employment programs while in the ase of the model with subsidised
jobs three mass points are identied. For eah of the models there is a predominant positive
orrelation between the exit rate to regular jobs and the exit rate to the partiular program. If
these positive orrelations are not aounted for, the treatment eets will be overestimated.
Indeed, as shown in Table 3, one we allow for unobserved heterogeneity the treatment eets
of all programs are either negative or not statistially dierent from zero.
Panel B in Table 3 reports the net eet of these programs on exits from unemployment
to regular jobs. This net eet is signiantly negative for basi training, advaned training,
and employment programs. The net eet is not statistially dierent from zero for subsidised
jobs.
To investigate the robustness of our results we perform a variety of sensitivity analyses,
one of whih is shown in Table 4.
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Reall that the main result for the jobs was obtained in a
trivariate MPH model that allows for a shift in the baseline hazard rate after 3, 6, 9, and 12
months respetively. Table 4 shows that the relevant parameter estimates of trivariate MPH
models that allow for a shift in the baseline hazard rate after every month, i.e. after 1, 2, ..., 17
29
In addition to this we estimated MMPH models for sub-programs. We did separate estimates for job
ourses, language ourses, omputer ourses, further voational training, other ourses, publi employment
programs, and private employment programs. This did not hange our main onlusions. As an alternative to
the disrete distribution of unobserved heterogeneity we tried using a multivariate log normal distribution of
unobserved heterogeneity. However, we were unable to nd any improvement in the log likelihood ompared
to the model that does not allow for unobserved heterogeneity. Apparently the multivariate log normal
speiation is too restritive.
months. Results for the model with a exible speiation of the baseline hazard are similar
to the baseline results. Changing the speiation of the baseline hazard does not aet the
estimates of the underlying heterogeneity distribution. Moreover, the exible baseline hazard
model also indiates that the treatment eets are negative or not statistially signiant from
zero.
Table 4
Table 5 allows for a time-of-entry eet in the ausal eet of training programs.
30
From
a statistial point of view it may be that unobserved heterogeneity is apturing funtional
form misspeiation in the baseline model. Suppose that program eets vary with time of
entry in the sense that the ausal eet of a program is worse when individuals enter the
program late in the unemployment spell. Negleting suh a time-of-entry eet then might
lead to wrongly identifying unobserved heterogeneity beause there is a group of job seekers
(entering late) with low exit rates and low program entry rates and another group of job
seekers (entering early) with a high exit rate and a high program entry rate. It is therefore
important to assess the sensitivity of our results to allowing for time-of-entry eets. Table
5 shows that time-of-entry eets matter for all programs exept for the advaned training
ourses. The results indiate that programs work better when job seekers enter early rather
than late. For instane, entering a program one month later is shown to derease the eet
of basi training program 5.5 perentage points (= 100[exp( 0:057)  1℄). Nevertheless, the
main onlusion from the baseline model remains unaeted. All Swiss ative labour market
programs either derease the exits from unemployment to regular jobs or their eets are not
signiantly dierent from zero beause there appears to be genuine unobserved heterogeneity
in exits to regular jobs, entry into the program that is being studied, and entry into other
30
We are grateful to a referee for raising this issue.
programs (endogenous right-ensoring).
Table 5
5 Conlusions
This paper disusses the eet of ALMPs on the duration of unemployment in a dynami
evaluation ontext. In the empirial analysis we disuss in detail to what extent the fun-
tional form assumption of the proportional hazard model and the assumption of onditional
independene may aet the evaluation results.
The empirial results of our paper ome in three parts. First, we use a mathing method
presenting the treatment eet results in the form of graphs. Though the set-up of the math-
ing estimator is dierent from the one in previous studies on the eetiveness of Swiss labour
market poliies the results are very muh the same. Seond, we use a proportional hazard
model with time-varying treatment eets. Both approahes lead to the same onlusion that
the program of subsidised jobs is the most promising program in terms of their positive eets
on the transition rate from unemployment to regular jobs. Third, we estimate a bivariate
MPH-model where regular jobs and ALMPs are ompeting destinations. In the ontext of
this model the treatment eet an be estimated aounting for seletivity both due to ob-
served and due to unobserved harateristis. We onlude that after allowing for seletivity
even the treatment eet of subsidised jobs fades away. The reason is that the unobserved
harateristis in the job nding rate and the program entrane rate are positively orrelated.
From a researh point of view our main result is that the mathing approah and the timing-
of-events approah generate dierent treatment eets one we allow unobserved heterogeneity
to inuene the inow into ALMPs. It is diÆult to ompare both methods diretly as
neither of them has a lear eonomi interpretation and the identifying assumptions are not
nested. The method of mathing is based on the onditional independene assumption, i.e. the
assumption that potential outomes and seletion into programs are independent onditional
on the observables. If this assumption is valid, the method of mathing is to be preferred
to other methods sine it is just-identied. In the timing-of-events approah it is possible
to relax this assumption and allow unobserved heterogeneity to aet the seletion proess.
However this omes at a ost sine it requires assumptions with respet to funtional form
and independene between unobservables and observables.
From a poliy point of view our main result is that the introdution of unobserved het-
erogeneity substantially aets the estimated treatment eet. This implies that further and
more detailed information regarding how job seekers are seleted into programs is ruial
before poliy reommendations an be made.
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Fig. 1:
Transition rate to Job and to ALMP
Source: Own calculations, based on Swiss unemployment register data.
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Fig. 2:
Transition rate to regular jobs, by treatment status
Notes: tc refers to duration until entry. The average duration until entry is 1.7, 4.1, and 9.3 
months for the three groups, respectively. no ALMP refers to the transition rate to jobs 
treating exits to ALMP as censored.
Source: Own calculations, based on Swiss unemployment register data.
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Fig. 3:
The Effects of Active Labor Market Programs 
Matching Estimator
Notes: S1 is the survivor curve with treatment, S0 is the counterfactual survivor curve without 
treatment for the treated. Dashes lines represent 95% confidence interval based on 250 sub-
samples.
Source: Own calculations, based on Swiss unemployment and social security register data.
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Fig. 4:
Comparing Conditional Independence 
PH Estimator vs. Matching Estimator (Match)
Notes: PH-Match is the difference in the effect (S1-S0) according to the PH estimator and the 
matching estimator. Dashes lines represent 95% confidence interval based on 250 sub-
samples.
Source: Own calculations, based on Swiss unemployment and social security register data.
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Table 1:
Descriptive Statistics of Active Labor Market Programs in Switzerland
Unemployment 
Duration at Entry 
[Months] ALMP-Duration [Months]
Cost per Person 
and Daya)
# Obs. [Mean] [SD] [Mean] [SD] [CHF]
Basic Training
Job Training 1386 3.17 (2.57) 0.78 (1.08) 150
Language Training 573 3.63 (2.70) 2.36 (1.38) 90
Computer Training 689 3.59 (2.82) 0.96 (0.96) 170
Advanced Training
Vocational Training 159 4.08 (3.19) 1.85 (2.04) ca. 150
Other Training 258 3.95 (3.16) 2.18 (2.27) ca. 150
Employment Program
Public 415 4.56 (3.23) 4.54 (2.56) ca. 70
Private 485 4.81 (3.46) 4.73 (2.40) ca. 70
Subsidized Jobs 3123 2.98 (2.75) 1.55 (2.61) -
Total 7088 3.41 (2.89) 1.83 (2.43)
Notes: a) Maximum cost that can be refunded to program supplier.
Source: Own calculations, based on Swiss unemployment register data.
Table 2:
The Effects of Active Labor Market Programs on Transitions to Regular Jobs
Proportional Hazard Estimates
Basic Training Advanced Training Employment Program Subsidized Jobs
A. Baseline Model
Treatment effects (after start of program)
0-2 months -0.207 (-4.580) -0.273 (-2.540) -0.765 (-7.770) 0.014 (0.370)
3-5 months -0.094 (-1.650) 0.144 (1.220) 0.021 (0.240) 0.170 (3.660)
6-8 months 0.076 (0.990) 0.366 (2.320) 0.339 (2.980) 0.265 (3.940)
9- months 0.365 (4.270) 0.370 (1.940) 0.340 (2.250) 0.335 (4.160)
Transition Rate to Jobs 0.079 (3.360) 0.079 (3.063) 0.079 (3.112) 0.080 (3.416)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Duration Dependence Yes Yes Yes Yes
log Likelihood -23866.1 -19626.8 -20258.9 -25349.2
N 15073 15073 15073 15073
B. Constant Treatment Effect -0.085 (-2.498) 0.010 (0.144) -0.215 (-3.518) 0.109 (3.733)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Duration Dependence Yes Yes Yes Yes
log Likelihood -24712.0 -20462.1 -21124.0 -26186.6
N 15073 15073 15073 15073
Notes: Coefficients represent effect on log hazard rate with asymptotic z-values in parentheses. 
Source: Own calculations, based on Swiss unemployment insurance and social security records.
Table 3:
Effects of Active Labor Market Programs on Transitions to Regular Jobs
MMPH model that allows for endogenous censoring
Basic Training Advanced Training Employment Program Subsidized Jobs
A. Baseline Model
Treatment effects (after start of program)
0-2 months -0.306 (-6.060) -0.392 (-3.077) -0.912 (-7.412) -0.074 (-1.771)
3-5 months -0.279 (-4.391) -0.050 (-0.381) -0.229 (-1.887) 0.035 (0.661)
6-8 months -0.233 (-2.696) 0.064 (0.356) -0.035 (-0.225) 0.053 (0.688)
9- months -0.060 (-0.572) -0.028 (-0.122) -0.154 (-0.750) 0.063 (0.624)
Transition Rate to Jobs
vua 0.085 (3.032) 0.084 (2.795) 0.084 (2.842) 0.086 (3.104)
vub/vua 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Transition Rate to Program
vpa 0.039 (1.985) 0.005 (0.810) 0.023 (1.012) 0.050 (2.077)
vpb/vpa 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Censoring Rate
vca 0.072 (2.574) 0.110 (3.075) 0.105 (2.969) 0.059 (2.456)
vcb/vca 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Prob(vu=vua, vp=vpa, vc=vca) 0.930 (12.776) 0.931 (26.606) 0.363 (3.175) 0.926 (14.182)
Prob(vu=vua, vp=vpa, vc=vcb) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Prob(vu=vua, vp=vpb, vc=vca) 0.000 0.000 0.576 (6.159) 0.000
Prob(vu=vua, vp=vpb, vc=vcb) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Prob(vu=vub, vp=vpa, vc=vca) 0.033 (0.349) 0.044 (0.459) 0.002 (0.006) 0.037 (0.458)
Prob(vu=vub, vp=vpa, vc=vcb) 0.000 0.000 0.031 (0.249) 0.000
Prob(vu=vub, vp=vpb, vc=vca) 0.018 (0.171) 0.000 0.006 (0.075) 0.018 (0.155)
Prob(vu=vub, vp=vpb, vc=vcb) 0.019 0.025 0.022 0.019
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Duration Dependence Yes Yes Yes Yes
log Likelihood -51101.8 -44022.0 -45562.2 -52629.9
N 15073 15073 15073 15073
B. Constant Treatment Effect -0.285 (-6.759) -0.203 (-2.353) -0.557 (-6.890) -0.036 (-0.975)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Duration Dependence Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unobserved Heterogeneity Yes Yes Yes Yes
log Likelihood -51104.6 -44025.8 -45583.4 -52632.4
N 15073 15073 15073 15073
Notes: Coefficients represent effect on log hazard rate with asymptotic z-values in parentheses. 
Source: Own calculations, based on Swiss unemployment insurance and social security records.
Table 4:
Sensitivity Analysis: Allowing for monthly shifts in the baseline hazards
MMPH model that allows for endogenous censoring
Basic Training Advanced Training Employment Program Subsidized Jobs
Treatment Effect
0-2 months -0.454 (-9.015) -0.502 (-3.858) -1.034 (-8.930) -0.209 (-5.009)
3-5 months -0.329 (-5.101) -0.081 (-0.605) -0.323 (-2.940) -0.004 (-0.077)
6-8 months -0.294 (-3.314) 0.008 (0.043) -0.163 (-1.167) 0.004 (0.052)
9- months -0.116 (-1.060) -0.105 (-0.442) -0.326 (-1.755) -0.043 (-0.405)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Duration Dependence Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unobserved Heterogeneity Yes Yes Yes Yes
log Likelihood -50127.5 -43176.5 -44691.8 -51595.8
N 15073 15073 15073 15073
Notes: Coefficients represent effect on log hazard rate with asymptotic z-values in parentheses. 
Source: Own calculations, based on Swiss unemployment insurance and social security records.
Table 5:
Sensitivity Analysis: Allowing for program start time effects
MMPH model that allows for endogenous censoring
Basic Training Advanced Training Employment Program Subsidized Jobs
Treatment effects (after start of program)
0-2 months -0.157 (-2.272) -0.307 (-1.850) -0.754 (-4.856) -0.001 (-0.018)
3-5 months -0.153 (-1.994) 0.024 (0.136) -0.098 (-0.688) 0.089 (1.529)
6-8 months -0.136 (-1.472) 0.128 (0.616) 0.067 (0.403) 0.087 (1.109)
9- months -0.024 (-0.226) 0.024 (0.101) -0.116 (-0.564) 0.059 (0.585)
Treatment effect (program start time, months) -0.057 (-3.090) -0.026 (-0.647) -0.050 (-1.842) -0.032 (-2.209)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Duration Dependence Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unobserved Heterogeneity Yes Yes Yes Yes
log Likelihood -51096.8 -44022.0 -45560.3 -52627.4
N 15073 15073 15073 15073
Notes: Coefficients represent effect on log hazard rate with asymptotic z-values in parentheses. 
Source: Own calculations, based on Swiss unemployment insurance and social security records.
